Introduction -- Decision making problems in risky projects -- Literature Review -- Model Construction -- Incentive to Acquire a Precursor -- Incentive to Continue the Research Trial -- Confidentiality of Observed Precursor -- Conclusion.

This book identifies and systematically confirms the various factors that allow dangerous nuclear power projects to proceed without adequate risk assessment, even as society recognizes the magnitude of risks associated with nuclear power generation. For the first time, it employs a communication game model to explore each factor individually. The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power.