Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals [online] / ed. Martin Grajner, Pedro Schmechtig

Frontmatter Table of Contents Acknowledgements Introduction: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

I. Epistemic reasons In defense of psychologism about reasons Learning from learning from our mistakes Destabilizing the error theory Peer disagreement, rational requirements, and evidence of evidence as evidence against

II. Epistemic norms Belief, truth and radical disagreement Assertion, knowledge and rational credibility: The scoreboard Commonality reconsidered: On the common source of epistemic standards Epistemic standards: High hopes and low expectations What do I care about epistemic norms?

III Epistemic consequentialism Epistemic normativity: From direct to indirect epistemic consequentialism Tradeoffs, self-promotion, and epistemic teleology Epistemic consequentialism: Its relation to ethical consequentialism and the truth-indication principle How to overstretch the ethics-epistemology analogy: Berker’s critique of epistemic consequentialism

IV. Epistemic goals and values External goals and inherent norms – A cluster-conception of epistemic normativity The aim of belief and the goal of truth: Reflections on Rosenberg Ought to believe, evidential understanding and the pursuit of wisdom Epistemic axiology Objectual understanding, factivity and belief Contributors
Author Index
Subject Index

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