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The Soul of Armies : Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK / Austin Long.

By:

Long, Austin [author.]

Material type: Text

TextLanguage: English Series: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2016]Copyright date: ©2016Description: 1 online resource : 1 map, 6 tablesContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781501703911

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

U21.2 .L66 2016eb

Online resources:

Contents:

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Military Doctrine and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency -- Chapter 2. Culture, Doctrine, and Military Professionalization -- Chapter 3. "The Habits and Usages of War" -- Chapter 4. From the Halls of Montezuma -- Chapter 5. A Family of Regiments -- Chapter 6. "A Nasty, Untidy Mess" -- Chapter 7. A Natural Experiment in I Corps, 1966-68 -- Chapter 8. Out of Africa -- Chapter 9. Counterinsurgency in the Land of Two Rivers -- Chapter 10. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003-11 -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Index

Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook-Package 2016Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016Title is part of eBook package: Cornell Univ. Press eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016-2017Summary: For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

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For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)

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