TY - BOOK AU - Li,Youqi AU - Li,Fan AU - Yang,Song AU - Zhang,Chuan ED - SpringerLink (Online service) TI - Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing: A Game-theoretic Approach T2 - SpringerBriefs in Computer Science, SN - 9789819969210 AV - QA76.59 PY - 2024/// CY - Singapore PB - Springer Nature Singapore, Imprint: Springer KW - Mobile computing KW - Cooperating objects (Computer systems) KW - Data mining KW - Computer science KW - Mathematics KW - Mathematical statistics KW - Algorithms KW - Mobile Computing KW - Cyber-Physical Systems KW - Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery KW - Probability and Statistics in Computer Science KW - Design and Analysis of Algorithms KW - Theory and Algorithms for Application Domains N1 - Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction -- Chapter 2: Long-term Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 3: Fair Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 4: Collaborative Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 5: Coopetition-aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 6: Summary N2 - Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people’s daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users’ participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users’ costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing. This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions. This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0 ER -