03718nam a22004455i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001300172072001600185072002300201072001500224100008400239245011900323250001800442264007500460300003400535336002600569337002600595338003600621347002400657490005000681505083200731520133401563650002802897650003002925710003402955773002602989776003603015776003603051776003603087830005703123856004603180912001403226912001503240999001703255978-3-031-52939-9DE-He21320251030111456.0cr nn 008mamaa240229s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315293999978-3-031-52939-97 a10.1007/978-3-031-52939-92doi 4aK201-487 7aLAB2bicssc 7aPHI0000002bisacsh 7aLAB2thema1 aSegatti, Marco.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut97225010aEqual Access to Justiceh[electronic resource] :bOn the Duty to Pause, Cool Down, and Listen /cby Marco Segatti.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXII, 191 p.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aLaw and Philosophy Library,x2215-0315 ;v1450 a1 Introduction -- Part I. Domain: conceptual, empirical and historical explorations of access to justice -- 2 Is there a (Human) Right of Access to Justice? -- 3 Equal access to justice: Three interpretations -- 4 Duties of assistance and the criminal/civil distinction -- 5 Unmet legal needs: identification and rich descriptions -- Part II Normative foundations -- 6 The need for a theoretical base: four arguments -- 7 Why capabilities? On the duty to, at times and provisionally, pause, cool down, and listen -- 8 The instrumentalities of access to justice in defending democratic cooperation -- Part III. Practical applications. Testing the political principles of equal access to justice -- 9 Free legal counsel and access to justice -- 10 Is group litigation legitimate? -- 11 Still Against Settlement? -- 12 Conclusion.  aIt is wrong when someone cannot exercise their rights in a court of law because they have no money to pay for a good lawyer, because they are too scared of the possible consequences, or because they simply don’t know that the law protects them. But does that mean governments have an obligation to intervene? And if so, how? This book provides the first systematic philosophical theory of equal access to justice. It begins by identifying the content of claims to equal access to justice. Then, it reviews traditional political and legal arguments on the right of access to justice, which it argues are both illuminating and insufficient. The best comparative way to approach equal access to justice, the book argues, is to think through the requirements of a moral, pre-political, duty to – at times and provisionally – pause, cool down and listen: in other words, we ought to demand that governments step in and protect access rights, because we have a moral and pre-political interest in cultivating our ability to comply with this duty. It is the recognition of this duty which best explains both law’s potential for promoting, as well as its potential for endangering, equal justice. In closing, the book tests this novel theory of equal access to justice against contemporary trends and reforms in procedural law. . 0aLawxPhilosophy.96759614aPhilosophy of Law.9722512 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303152938208iPrinted edition:z978303152940508iPrinted edition:z9783031529412 0aLaw and Philosophy Library,x2215-0315 ;v14597225240uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52939-9  aZDB-2-LCR  aZDB-2-SXLC  c58045d58045