03261nam a22004935i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001300172072001600185072002300201072001600224100008500240245012500325250001800450264007500468300004200543336002600585337002600611338003600637347002400673490011200697505027300809520115001082650002402232650002102256650003202277650002402309650002102333650003402354710003402388773002602422776003602448776003602484776003602520830011902556856004602675912001402721912001502735999001702750978-3-031-52625-1DE-He21320251030111458.0cr nn 008mamaa240301s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315262519978-3-031-52625-17 a10.1007/978-3-031-52625-12doi 4aBD95-131 7aHPJ2bicssc 7aPHI0130002bisacsh 7aQDTJ2thema1 aAzzano, Lorenzo.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut97234910aDispositional Realityh[electronic resource] :bA Novel Approach to Power Ontology and Metaphysics /cby Lorenzo Azzano.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXI, 246 p. 1 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v4820 a1. Introduction -- 2. Reality -- 3. Appearance -- 4. Dispositional Reality -- 5. In favour of Dispositional Reality -- 6. The extent of Dispositional Reality -- 7. Explaining with dispositions -- 8. Meta-explanatory questions -- 9. The future of Dispositional Reality.  aDispositionalism, perhaps the most popular variant of non-Humean metaphysics, submits that dispositions, powers, or capacities, are part of the furniture of the world. In this book I advance an original approach to dispositionalism revolving around the notion of Dispositional Reality; the novelty lies in the fact that the account, unlike most alternatives on the market, does not require the reification of objects, facts, properties, nor their dispositional essences – and is in fact compatible with a far more deflationary approach to dispositions, while still being true to the non-Humean spirit of the proposal. This power metaphysics without powers allows one to dispel several puzzles in recent literature, or recast them under a new light. Albeit with its own peculiarities, this proposal constitutes a variant of explanatory dispositionalism, according to which realism about dispositions ought not to be understood as an ontological inflation, but as an explanatory inversion within the nomic and modal family. Some of these explanations are hereby attempted, and a study of various types of non-causal explanation will be provided. 0aMetaphysics.970839 0aOntology.960617 0aSciencexPhilosophy.96330714aMetaphysics.97083924aOntology.96061724aPhilosophy of Science.9685602 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303152624408iPrinted edition:z978303152626808iPrinted edition:z9783031526275 0aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v48297235040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52625-1  aZDB-2-REP  aZDB-2-SXPR  c58076d58076