03216nam a22004215i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100024003500118050001500153050000800168072001600176072002300192072001500215100008300230245010800313250001800421264007900439300004400518336002600562337002600588338003600614347002400650505054200674520125901216650002502475650002402500650002702524650002902551710003402580773002602614776003602640776003602676776003602712856004602748978-3-031-52585-8DE-He21320251030111755.0cr nn 008mamaa240330s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315258587 a10.1007/978-3-031-52585-82doi 4aQ174-175.3 4aB67 7aPDA2bicssc 7aSCI0750002bisacsh 7aPDA2thema1 aHattiangadi, Jagdish.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut10aFrancis Bacon’s Skeptical Recipes for New Knowledgeh[electronic resource] /cby Jagdish Hattiangadi.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer Nature Switzerland :bImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,c2024.  aXXXI, 290 p. 4 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda0 aChapter 1, Logical Doubts Concerning Induction -- Chapter 2, Socrates and the Skeptical Craft -- Chapter 3, The Active Fallibilism of a Situational Skeptic -- Chapter 4, Pyrrhonian, a School of Skeptics -- Chapter 5, Freedom by Confinement -- Chapter 6, The Sphinx -- Chapter 7, Evidence and Its Refutation -- Chapter 8, Francis Bacon’s Elenchus -- Chapter 9, A Mathematical Method for Physics -- Chapter 10, A Foundational Skepticism -- Chapter 11, Applying the Foundational Method -- Chapter 12, Applying The Experimental Philosophy.  aThe book sets an ambitious goal. It devises a new account of scientific methodology that makes it possible to explain how scientists manage, at least occasionally, to find true models of reality. The new methods may be contrasted with all those currently available that employ “coherence theories” of knowledge. Under this designation are grouped positions that can seem very different (such as those of Poincaré, Duhem, Popper, Hempel, Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend) but are united by the idea that the most general statements of science are merely hypotheses. They may be conjectures, opinions, conventions, posits, paradigms, or even myths. The most we can claim to know from such generalities is that they are internally consistent and coherent with empirical data. Consistency is insufficient to establish the truth of a conceptual system because many different systems, perhaps an infinite number, can be logically consistent and cohere with recorded data. Such is the well-known problem of the empirical under-determination of theories. Francis Bacon’s Skeptical Recipes for New Knowledge suggests a new methodology that solves this fundamental problem of knowledge. Jagdish Hattiangadi is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Canada. 0aSciencexPhilosophy. 0aPhilosophy, Modern.14aPhilosophy of Science.24aEarly Modern Philosophy.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303152584108iPrinted edition:z978303152586508iPrinted edition:z978303152587240uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52585-8