03493nam a22005535i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001500172050000800187072001600195072002300211072001500234100008300249245011700332250001800449264007500467300004500542336002600587337002600613338003600639347002400675490011200699505029200811520119101103650003202294650002402326650002602350650003302376650002102409650003402430650002402464650002602488650002502514650002102539710003402560773002602594776003602620776003602656776003602692830011902728856004602847912001402893912001502907999001702922978-3-031-54227-5DE-He21320251030111805.0cr nn 008mamaa240404s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315422759978-3-031-54227-57 a10.1007/978-3-031-54227-52doi 4aQ174-175.3 4aB67 7aPDA2bicssc 7aSCI0750002bisacsh 7aPDA2thema1 aGhins, Michel.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut97474210aScientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powersh[electronic resource] /cby Michel Ghins.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXVIII, 211 p. 1 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v4830 aForeword -- Introduction -- 1. What is a scientific theory? -- 2. Scientific realism: what is at stake? -- 3. Scientific realism: a defence -- 4. The categorical conceptions of laws -- 5. A dualist metaphysics of nature -- General conclusion -- References -- Name index -- Subject index.  aThis book addresses central issues in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, namely the nature of scientific theories, their partial truth, and the necessity of scientific laws within a moderate realist and empiricist perspective. Accordingly, good arguments in favour of the existence of unobservable entities postulated by our best theories, such as electrons, must be inductively grounded on perceptual experience and not their explanatory power as most defenders of scientific realism claim. Similarly, belief in the reality of dispositions such as causal powers which ground the natural necessity of scientific laws must be based on experience. Hence, this book offers a synthetic presentation of an original metaphysics of science, namely a metaphysics of properties, both categorical and dispositional, while at the same time opposing strong versions of necessitarism according to which laws are true in all possible worlds. The main theses and arguments are clearly presented in a non-technical way. Thus, on top of being of interest to the specialists of the topics discussed, it is also useful as a textbook in courses for third year and more advanced university students. 0aSciencexPhilosophy.963307 0aMetaphysics.970839 0aPhilosophy of nature. 0aKnowledge, Theory of.959222 0aOntology.96061714aPhilosophy of Science.96856024aMetaphysics.97083924aPhilosophy of Nature.24aEpistemology.96978324aOntology.9606172 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303154226808iPrinted edition:z978303154228208iPrinted edition:z9783031542299 0aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v48397235040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54227-5  aZDB-2-REP  aZDB-2-SXPR  c58952d58952