03759nam a22004935i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001300172050001300185072001600198072002300214072001500237245010300252250001800355264007500373300003200448336002600480337002600506338003600532347002400568490005000592505049400642520149501136650002802631650002502659650006202684650003002746700008702776700008502863710003402948773002602982776003603008776003603044776003603080830005703116856004603173912001403219912001503233999001703248978-3-031-54067-7DE-He21320251030111807.0cr nn 008mamaa240406s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315406779978-3-031-54067-77 a10.1007/978-3-031-54067-72doi 4aK201-487 4aK140-165 7aLAB2bicssc 7aLAW0000002bisacsh 7aLAB2thema10aTheories of Legal Obligationh[electronic resource] /cedited by Deryck Beyleveld, Stefano Bertea.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aV, 168 p.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aLaw and Philosophy Library,x2215-0315 ;v1460 aIntroduction -- Part 1: What a Legal Obligation is -- Toward a Minimal Conception of Legal Obligation -- What is a Legal Obligation? -- Part 2: Theoretical Perspectives on Legal Obligation -- Why Any Legal Positivist Idea of Legal Obligation is Untenable: A Kantian-Gewirthian Synthesis -- Gustav Radbruch’s Theory of Legal Obligation -- Part 3: Forms of Legal Obligation -- Is There a Legal Duty not to Harm in Tort Law? -- Reflections on the Justifiability of Authority: Raz vs. Wolff.  aThis volume collects six original essays by internationally respected researchers who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation. It brings together works that innovatively address key dimensions of the current debates concerning legal obligation from different and, in some cases, even opposing theoretical perspectives. As a result, the collection offers a comprehensive discussion of legal obligation that promises to significantly advance our understanding of the obligatory dimension of law. What specifically connects the contributions gathered here is one common thread: coming to terms with a notion – legal obligation – that is of both practical and theoretical importance. On the one hand, it is widely regarded as a fundamental legal concept by legal practitioners and laypeople alike, as not only judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and juries but also ordinary citizens make extensive use of obligation-related terms and discourses. On the other hand, the notion of legal obligation is of paramount significance for the theory of law. Indeed, even legal theorists who, quite understandably, refuse to reduce the law to a mere obligation-imposing device and opt instead for a view in which the normative dimension of the law also encompasses powers, rights, permissions, privileges and immunities, duly acknowledge the centrality of legal obligation for the understanding and conceptualisation of law. Hence the importance of the treatments presented in this volume. 0aLawxPhilosophy.967596 0aLawxHistory.96759714aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.96760024aPhilosophy of Law.9722511 aBeyleveld, Deryck.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt9748051 aBertea, Stefano.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt9748062 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303154066008iPrinted edition:z978303154068408iPrinted edition:z9783031540691 0aLaw and Philosophy Library,x2215-0315 ;v14697225240uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54067-7  aZDB-2-LCR  aZDB-2-SXLC  c58983d58983