04925nam a22005295i 4500 978-3-031-49715-5 DE-He213 20251030111808.0 cr nn 008mamaa 240408s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d 9783031497155 978-3-031-49715-5 10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5 doi BD143-237 HPK bicssc PHI004000 bisacsh QDTK thema McGee, Andrew. author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 74845 Intuitively Rational: How We Think and How We Should [electronic resource] / by Andrew McGee, Charles Foster. 1st ed. 2024. Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland : Imprint: Springer, 2024. XIII, 215 p. 5 illus. online resource. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Chapter 1. Introduction: the Agony of Corinne Rey -- Chapter 2. Beginnings -- Chapter 3. Neuroscience and judgement -- Chapter 4. Taking the evolutionary psychological elephant by the tusks -- Chapter 5. Moral truth -- Chapter 6. Can our moral beliefs be debunked? -- Chapter 7. Selfish genes and morality -- Chapter 8. Joshua Greene’s empirical challenge to deontology -- Chapter 9. Limits of trolley-problem-style thought experiments -- Chapter 10. Realistic trolleyology? -- Chapter 11. Steering a course between intuitionism and austere rationalism -- Chapter 12. Conclusion. This book is about the respective roles of intuition and reasoning in ethics. It responds to a number of well-known philosophers and psychologists, and proposes a new perspective – radical in its moderation. It examines in depth the work of the philosopher Joshua Greene and the psychologist Jonathan Haidt. With the so-called empirical turn in ethics, much work has been done to try to isolate the role of reason and intuition in forming our moral judgements, with Haidt and Greene leading the research programmes and attracting much of the professional and public attention, and many others following. The current view – shared by both camps – is that intuition is largely the driver of our moral judgements – a view summed up in Haidt’s slogan ‘intuition first, strategic reasoning second’. Haidt believes we have to live with this and accept it. Greene does not: he contends that our intuitions, while suitable for the environments in which we evolved, are worthless in the modern, global, technological age, and to avoid ethical disaster we must learn to adopt reason as the arbiter of moral truth. This book steers a middle course between these two positions and is therefore of great interest to philosophers and psychologists alike. Intuition and reason, and different conceptions of them, lie behind many significant discussions in recent philosophical ethics and moral psychology. One effect of those discussions has been the insertion of a wedge between the two notions. In this engaging and fascinating book, McGee and Foster make a thought-provoking case for removing that wedge. Professor Roger Crisp, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford I wanted to cheer all the way through this beautifully written book – one that is both incisive and profoundly humane. So much moral philosophy is ensnared in simple rationalism or simple intuitionism: this book argues that intuition and reason are not just at times compatible, in a sort of uneasy compromise, but that each is always essential to the proper functioning of the other. Its takedown of so much utilitarianism is long overdue. It embraces what can be learnt from neuroscience and at the same time appeals to morality in the practice of life, not just in the seminar room. A book that should be on every intelligent reader’s shelves. Dr Iain McGilchrist, author of The Master and His Emissary and The Matter with Things. Knowledge, Theory of. 59222 Philosophy of mind. Ethics. 58934 Epistemology. 69783 Moral Psychology. 74846 Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics. 66410 Foster, Charles. author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 74847 SpringerLink (Online service) Springer Nature eBook Printed edition: 9783031497148 Printed edition: 9783031497162 Printed edition: 9783031497179 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5 ZDB-2-BSP ZDB-2-SXBP 58998 58998