03683nam a22004695i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100024003500118050001400153072001600167072002300183072001600206245010900222250001800331264007500349300006300424336002600487337002600513338003600539347002400575490006800599505083500667520115001502650002602652650002402678650001702702650001802719650002402737650001702761700008102778700007202859710003402931773002602965776003602991776003603027776003603063830006803099856004603167978-3-031-52231-4DE-He21320251030112100.0cr nn 008mamaa240527s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315223147 a10.1007/978-3-031-52231-42doi 4aBD143-237 7aHPK2bicssc 7aPHI0040002bisacsh 7aQDTK2thema10aEmpirical Reason and Sensory Experienceh[electronic resource] /cedited by Miloš Vuletić, Ori Beck.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXII, 390 p. 4 illus., 1 illus. in color.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science,x2214-9783 ;v600 aPart 1: Chapter 1. An Exposition of Reformed Empiricism -- Chapter 2. Discussion of Gupta’s “An Exposition of Reformed Empiricism -- Part 2: Chapter 3. "Perceiving that p" - Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances -- Chapter 4. Discussion of Kern’s “’Perceiving that p’ - Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances” -- Part 3: Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6. Discussion of Peacocke’s -- Part 4: Chapter 7. Capacities First: Epistemic Externalism without Epistemic Disjunctivism -- Chapter 8. Discussion of Susanna Schellenberg’s “Capacities First: Epistemic Externalism without Epistemic Disjunctivism”. Part 5: Chapter 9. Two Conceptions of Perceptual Justification: Do their Differences matter? -- Chapter 10. Discussion of Wright’s “Two Conceptions of Perceptual Justification: Do their Differences matter?”.  aThe volume offers a lively and wide-ranging debate on the major questions of perceptual epistemology, including how perceptual experiences can bestow positive epistemic standing to empirical judgments and beliefs; the relative epistemic import of veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences; the relation between experience and knowledge; and the nature of experience in view of its epistemic linkages to discursive contents. The volume is centered around five cutting-edge essays by leading authors in these areas—Anil Gupta, Andrea Kern, Christopher Peacocke, Susanna Schellenberg and Crispin Wright—along with no less than thirty contributions scrutinizing and critically discussing the essays, prompting detailed rejoinders from the lead authors. The volume closes with an extensive debate between Annalisa Coliva, Gupta and Wright. Taken as a whole, the volume covers much ground in epistemology of perception and displays a variety of approaches and perspectives through fruitful and accessible exchanges. It will be of interest not only to researchers working in perceptual epistemology but also to students new to the subject. 0aKnowledge, Theory of. 0aPhilosophy of mind. 0aMetaphysics.14aEpistemology.24aPhilosophy of Mind.24aMetaphysics.1 aVuletić, Miloš.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt1 aBeck, Ori.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303152230708iPrinted edition:z978303152232108iPrinted edition:z9783031522338 0aLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science,x2214-9783 ;v6040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52231-4