03103nam a22004335i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100024003500118050001900153072001700172072002300189072001600212100008000228245014000308250001800448264007900466300004300545336002600588337002600614338003600640347002400676505040700700520120301107650001502310650002602325650002302351650002402374650002602398650003102424710003402455773002602489776003602515776003602551776003602587856004602623978-3-031-54291-6DE-He21320251030112858.0cr nn 008mamaa240818s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315429167 a10.1007/978-3-031-54291-62doi 4aJF1001-1048.52 7aJPHF2bicssc 7aPOL0080002bisacsh 7aJPHF2thema1 aMatthieß, Theres.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut10aRetrospective Pledge Voting and Political Accountabilityh[electronic resource] :bThe Costs of Broken Promises /cby Theres Matthieß.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer Nature Switzerland :bImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,c2024.  aXX, 245 p. 30 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda0 a1. Election pledges, democratic representation and voting -- 2. How pledge performance affects voting -- 3. A threefold empirical investigation of RPV -- 4. RPV at the aggregate level: Evidence from observational data -- 5. RPV at the group level: Evidence from survey data -- 6. RPV at the micro level: Evidence from experimental data -- 7. New evidence on RPV -- 8. A good or bad sign for democracy?.  aThis book examines retrospective pledge voting; the phenomenon of whether and under which conditions citizens are likely to withdraw their support for political parties that have failed to turn their pre-election pledges into tangible policies once they have joined government. It puts forward a new theoretical framework on retrospective pledge voting. Whilst one would expect voters to punish government parties that have broken their promises by refusing to vote for them at the next election, little research has been done to show whether, and under what contexts, this is actually the case. Adopting a multi-methods approach, the book demonstrates that citizens do punish government parties that have shown a poor performance in fulfilling their election pledges, and that more sceptical citizens withnegative pre-existing opinions punish pledge breakage more severely. Bringing together research on election pledges, government performance and voting, the book will appeal to all those interested in democratic representation, politics, public policy, and voter-party linkages. Theres Matthieß is Assistant Professor of Empirical Democracy Research at the University of Göttingen, Germany. 0aElections. 0aPolitical leadership. 0aPolitical science.14aElectoral Politics.24aPolitical Leadership.24aGovernance and Government.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303154290908iPrinted edition:z978303154292308iPrinted edition:z978303154293040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54291-6