03776nam a22005055i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001700172072001600189072002300205072001600228100008800244245015300332250001800485264007900503300004100582336002600623337002600649338003600675347002400711505017500735520179500910650002402705650003702729650002602766650002302792650002402815650003602839650002502875650002302900700008702923710003403010773002603044776003603070776003603106776003603142856004603178912001403224912001503238999001703253978-3-031-57559-4DE-He21320251030112908.0cr nn 008mamaa240824s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830315755949978-3-031-57559-47 a10.1007/978-3-031-57559-42doi 4aBD418-418.84 7aHPM2bicssc 7aPHI0150002bisacsh 7aQDTM2thema1 aBennett, Maxwell R.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut98053114aThe Representational Fallacy in Neuroscience and Psychologyh[electronic resource] :bA Critical Analysis /cby Maxwell R Bennett, Peter M S Hacker.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer Nature Switzerland :bImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,c2024.  aIX, 85 p. 3 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda0 a1. The Varieties of Conceptions of Representation -- 2. The Early History of Representations in Experimental Psychology -- 3. The Early History of Neural Representations.  aThis book traces the history and coherence of the use of the word ‘representations’ from its origins, particularly in the description of artefacts, to its use in the description of so-called mental and neural representations in the mind and in the brain. It is shown that there are no good reasons for this transition. Experimental psychology is confused in taking what one perceives to be a mental representation. Neuroscientists need to avoid moving readily between the notions of neural and mental representations; indeed even the logic of taking a pattern of neural activity as standing for some sensibly experienced characteristic requires elucidation. It is concluded that the word ‘representation’ when used in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience is confounding. Maxwell R Bennett is Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience and held the first University Chair for ‘research recognized internationally to be of exceptional distinction’ at the University of Sydney. This research is on the biophysics and neurobiology of synapses. He is the author and c0-author of over 300 papers as well as of thirteen books on the neuroscience, history and philosophy of this subject. In the last twenty years he founded The Brain and Mind Research Institute, as well as The Mind & Neuroscience Thompson Institute, each concerned with ameliorating mental illness. Peter Hacker is Emeritus Fellow of St John's College, Oxford and holds an Honorary Professorship at University College, London at the Institute of Neurology. He is a leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, has written extensively on philosophy and neuroscience, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of human nature. He is author and co-author of more than twenty-five books. 0aPhilosophy of mind. 0aPsychology, Experimental.982104 0aNeurosciences.968384 0aCognitive science.14aPhilosophy of Mind.24aExperimental Psychology.98210524aNeuroscience.96838624aCognitive Science.1 aHacker, Peter M S.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut9827952 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303157558708iPrinted edition:z978303157560008iPrinted edition:z978303157561740uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57559-4  aZDB-2-REP  aZDB-2-SXPR  c62685d62685