04161nam a22004815i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001300172072001600185072002300201072001500224245013500239250001800374264007500392300004500467336002600512337002600538338003600564347002400600490011200624505090800736520134401644650004702988650003203035650003503067650003403102700008003136700008403216710003403300773002603334776003603360776003603396776003603432830011903468856004603587912001403633912001503647999001703662978-3-031-66081-8DE-He21320251030112940.0cr nn 008mamaa240905s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d a97830316608189978-3-031-66081-87 a10.1007/978-3-031-66081-82doi 4aP101-120 7aCFA2bicssc 7aPHI0380002bisacsh 7aCFA2thema10aRetraction Mattersh[electronic resource] :bNew Developments in the Philosophy of Language /cedited by Dan Zeman, Mihai Hîncu. a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer International Publishing :bImprint: Springer,c2024. aVIII, 232 p. 16 illus.bonline resource. atextbtxt2rdacontent acomputerbc2rdamedia aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier atext filebPDF2rda1 aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v4880 a1. Introduction (Mihai Hîncu and Dan Zeman) -- Part I: Insights from the Debate about Perspectival Expressions. 2. Taste Predicates and Retraction Data: An Improved Framework (Jeremy Wyatt and Joseph Ulatowski) -- 3. Falsity and Retraction: New Experimental Data on Epistemic Modals (Teresa Marques) -- 4. Relativism and Retraction: The Case Is Not Yet Lost (Dan Zeman) -- 5. Relevance in Epistemic Modal Disagreement (Jesse Fitts) -- Part II: Insights from Speech Act Theory and Conversational Dynamics. 6. “Actually, Scratch That”: A Tour into the Illocutionary Fabric of Retraction (Laura Caponetto) -- 7. Nevermind: On Retraction as a Speech Act (Lwenn Bussière-Caraes, Luca Incurvati, Giorgio Sbardolini, and Julian Schlöder) -- 8. Assertion and Retraction (Andy Egan) -- 9. The Ethics of Retraction (Quill Kukla) -- 10. Retraction and Verbal Disputes (Pedro Abreu and Marcin Lewiński). aThis book offers the first sustained investigation of the phenomenon of retraction - the “taking back” of the conventional or deontic effects of a previous speech act - bringing together issues and solutions from the semantics of perspectival expressions and from the framework of Speech Act theory. It addresses questions that have been at the center of lively debates in philosophy of language and linguistics, but also draws out some of the ramifications these questions have for certain debates in the logic of discourse, philosophy of mind or experimental philosophy. Many times, what we say on a certain occasion proves to be wrong. When we realize this, we sometimes react by retracting what was previously said – formally or informally, explicitly or not. The essays in this volume tackle issues such as what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for successfully performing a retraction, whether there is a solid empirical basis for retraction, whether the phenomenon can be used in favor or against certain semantics views, whether there is a type of retraction that is merely verbal, or what are the ethical implications of retraction. The volume brings together and puts in dialogue renowned researchers on these topics, serving both as a fixture for specialists and as an introduction into the topic of retraction. 0aLanguage and languagesxPhilosophy.973516 0aSciencexPhilosophy.96330714aPhilosophy of Language.97351824aPhilosophy of Science.9685601 aZeman, Dan.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt9837801 aHîncu, Mihai.eeditor.4edt4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt9837812 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303166080108iPrinted edition:z978303166082508iPrinted edition:z9783031660832 0aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v48897235040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66081-8 aZDB-2-REP aZDB-2-SXPR c63138d63138