04195nam a22005655i 4500 978-3-031-58241-7 DE-He213 20251030113121.0 cr nn 008mamaa 241002s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d 9783031582417 978-3-031-58241-7 10.1007/978-3-031-58241-7 doi HB139-141 KCA bicssc BUS021000 bisacsh KCA thema Dehez, Pierre. author. (orcid)0000-0002-0752-7548 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0752-7548 aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 85435 Game Theory for the Social Sciences [electronic resource] : Conflict, Bargaining, Cooperation and Power / by Pierre Dehez. 1st ed. 2024. Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland : Imprint: Springer, 2024. XIV, 298 p. 86 illus., 6 illus. in color. online resource. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Springer Series in Game Theory, Official Series of the Game Theory Society, 1868-5188 Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Strategy and conflict -- Chapter 3. Bargaining and consensus -- Chapter 4. Cooperation and fair division -- Chapter 5. Voting and power. This textbook introduces fundamental concepts of game theory and demonstrates its uses and application in the social sciences. Written in plain English and without overwhelming mathematical jargon, it serves as an invaluable resource for undergraduate students in economics, law, political sciences, and related social sciences. Starting from non-cooperative games and progressing to cooperative games, it explores a wide range of topics, including the analysis of zero-sum games, voting rules and their practical implications, and other applications of game theory. Uniquely, it emphasizes cooperative concepts and their normative applications, providing a fresh perspective. With "Game Theory for the Social Sciences", readers will be equipped with the analytical tools to analyze conflict resolution, bargaining strategies, cooperative decision-making, and the dynamics of power relationships. Through engaging examples drawn from real-world scenarios, readers will develop a solid understanding of how game theory can be applied to diverse fields in social sciences. “Pierre Dehez offers a consistent kit of classic game theoretic tools, from equilibrium concepts to bargaining solutions and power indices, all illustrated with insightful examples and applications.” Françoise Forges, Professor of Economics, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL “This book is written clearly and pedagogically without resorting to difficult mathematics. It provides many different and interesting examples from problems of fair sharing, bargaining to voting systems and many others. It is a perfect introduction to this subject too often quoted but too often misunderstood.” Alan Kirman, Directeur d’études, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and Emeritus Professor, Aix-Marseille University. Econometrics. 57695 Economics Psychological aspects. 59551 Microeconomics. 58393 Political science. 58714 Quantitative Economics. 70330 Behavioral Economics. 69174 Microeconomics. 58393 Political Science. 58714 SpringerLink (Online service) Springer Nature eBook Printed edition: 9783031582400 Printed edition: 9783031582424 Printed edition: 9783031582431 Springer Series in Game Theory, Official Series of the Game Theory Society, 1868-5188 85436 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58241-7 ZDB-2-ECF ZDB-2-SXEF 63919 63919