03535nam a22004815i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020003700100024003500137050001500172050000800187072001600195072002300211072001500234100008000249245011600329250001800445264006900463300004300532336002600575337002600601338003600627347002400663490011200687505030700799520146601106650003202572650001802604650003402622650001802656710003402674773002602708776003602734776003602770776003602806830011902842856004602961912001403007912001503021999001703036978-3-031-74175-3DE-He21320251030113249.0cr nn 008mamaa241028s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830317417539978-3-031-74175-37 a10.1007/978-3-031-74175-32doi 4aQ174-175.3 4aB67 7aPDA2bicssc 7aSCI0750002bisacsh 7aPDA2thema1 aAkiba, Ken.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut98673710aIndeterminacy, Vagueness, and Truthh[electronic resource] :bThe Boolean Many-Valued Approach /cby Ken Akiba.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer Nature Switzerland :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXV, 145 p. 26 illus.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v4930 aPreface -- Chapter 1. Boolean Many-Valued Logic -- Chapter 2. The Fission Problem and the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity -- Chapter 3. Vagueness, the Sorites Paradox and Precisifications -- Chapter 4. An Ontic Theory of Indeterminacy and Vagueness -- Chapter 5. Truth and the Liar Paradox -- Index.  aThis book shows that the assumption that classical logic is essentially a bivalent (i.e., 2-valued) logic, a logic of truth and falsity, is an incorrect and harmful conception. Classical logic is certainly a Boolean logic, and the smallest (non-degenerate) Boolean algebra is the 2-element Boolean algebra; however, there are numerous Boolean algebras that have more than 2 elements, such as the 4-, 8-, 16-, ..., infinite-element Boolean algebra, and they all work equally well for the semantics of classical logic. Contrary to the popular thought, there is such a thing as classical (or Boolean) many-valued logic. The book applies this logic to solve such philosophical problems as the Fission Problem for personal identity, the Sorites Paradox, and the Liar Paradox. All these problems concern situations that involve indeterminacy or vagueness, situations where there seems 'no fact of the matter' that makes the relevant sentences true or false, thus requiring truth value gaps between truth and falsity. Because of that, classical logic has been thought to be an inadequate tool to deal with the problems. This book, however, offers solutions to those problems by retaining classical logic but assigning intermediate Boolean values to the relevant sentences. The book is of great value to researchers and graduate students in philosophy, especially for those who are interested in the philosophical issues surrounding indeterminacy, vagueness, and truth. 0aSciencexPhilosophy.963307 0aLogic.97067414aPhilosophy of Science.96856024aLogic.9706742 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303174174608iPrinted edition:z978303174176008iPrinted edition:z9783031741777 0aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,x2542-8292 ;v49397235040uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74175-3  aZDB-2-REP  aZDB-2-SXPR  c64556d64556