04066nam a22005055i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100024003500118050001300153072001600166072002300182072001500205100007900220245017400299250001800473264006900491300006700560336002600627337002600653338003600679347002400715490004300739505072300782520149501505650001503000650003803015650002603053650002803079650002903107650004403136650004003180650002103220650002603241650003603267710003403303773002603337776003603363776003603399776003603435830004303471856004603514978-3-031-74951-3DE-He21320251030114647.0cr nn 008mamaa241228s2024    sz |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97830317495137 a10.1007/978-3-031-74951-32doi 4aHB74.P65 7aKCP2bicssc 7aPOL0230002bisacsh 7aKCP2thema1 aEnglund, Chase C.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut14aThe Politics of Attracting Investmenth[electronic resource] :bAuthoritarianism, Political Competition, and the International Market for Capital /cby Chase C. Englund.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aCham :bSpringer Nature Switzerland :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXXIII, 348 p. 61 illus., 52 illus. in color.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aContributions to Economics,x2197-71780 a -- Part I.  -- Introduction to FDI in Authoritarian States.  -- Theoretical Foundations for Understanding Autocratic FDI.  -- Understanding FDI under Autocracy: Theoretical Approach.  -- Political Competition and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings.  -- Economic Elites and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings.  -- Testing the Mechanism of Policy Uncertainty.  -- Targeted FDI in Nondemocratic States: Empirical Findings.  -- FDI in Authoritarian States: Conclusions.  -- Part II.  -- Examination of Foreign Portfolio Investment.  -- Examination of Democratic States.  -- Examination of Domestic Investment.  -- Applications for Conflict and Foreign Policy.  -- Other Types of Elites.  -- Conclusions and Policy Implications.  aThis book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors’ uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between “economic elites” are more likely to attract investment inflows. However, these inflows are the result of incentives provided as private benefits for incumbent elites, and tend to result in concentrated inflows. In Part II, this is contrasted with the way democratic states attract investment through institutional protections and public benefits. In this way, the author uncovers that authoritarian and democratic states achieve investor confidence through “alternate paths to predictability”, one based on eliminating opposition through political consolidation and the other based on impartial rules and legal protections designed to constrain the excesses of political competition. The theory’s central premise, that the concentration of economic influence with fewer “economic elites” is corrosive to political competition and institutional quality, carries huge significance for the study of both authoritarian and democratic governance quality. 0aEconomics. 0aInternational economic relations. 0aEconomic development. 0aComparative government. 0aSecurity, International.14aPolitical Economy and Economic Systems.24aInternational Political Economy’.24aEconomic Growth.24aComparative Politics.24aInternational Security Studies.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978303174950608iPrinted edition:z978303174952008iPrinted edition:z9783031749537 0aContributions to Economics,x2197-717840uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3