04456nam a22005895i 4500 978-3-031-74951-3 DE-He213 20251030114647.0 cr nn 008mamaa 241228s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d 9783031749513 978-3-031-74951-3 10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3 doi HB74.P65 KCP bicssc POL023000 bisacsh KCP thema Englund, Chase C. author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 89757 The Politics of Attracting Investment [electronic resource] : Authoritarianism, Political Competition, and the International Market for Capital / by Chase C. Englund. 1st ed. 2024. Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland : Imprint: Springer, 2024. XXIII, 348 p. 61 illus., 52 illus. in color. online resource. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Contributions to Economics, 2197-7178 -- Part I. -- Introduction to FDI in Authoritarian States. -- Theoretical Foundations for Understanding Autocratic FDI. -- Understanding FDI under Autocracy: Theoretical Approach. -- Political Competition and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Economic Elites and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Testing the Mechanism of Policy Uncertainty. -- Targeted FDI in Nondemocratic States: Empirical Findings. -- FDI in Authoritarian States: Conclusions. -- Part II. -- Examination of Foreign Portfolio Investment. -- Examination of Democratic States. -- Examination of Domestic Investment. -- Applications for Conflict and Foreign Policy. -- Other Types of Elites. -- Conclusions and Policy Implications. This book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors’ uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between “economic elites” are more likely to attract investment inflows. However, these inflows are the result of incentives provided as private benefits for incumbent elites, and tend to result in concentrated inflows. In Part II, this is contrasted with the way democratic states attract investment through institutional protections and public benefits. In this way, the author uncovers that authoritarian and democratic states achieve investor confidence through “alternate paths to predictability”, one based on eliminating opposition through political consolidation and the other based on impartial rules and legal protections designed to constrain the excesses of political competition. The theory’s central premise, that the concentration of economic influence with fewer “economic elites” is corrosive to political competition and institutional quality, carries huge significance for the study of both authoritarian and democratic governance quality. Economics. 58354 International economic relations. 58104 Economic development. 58075 Comparative government. 67598 Security, International. 58210 Political Economy and Economic Systems. 70994 International Political Economy’. 71374 Economic Growth. 58347 Comparative Politics. 60386 International Security Studies. 69560 SpringerLink (Online service) Springer Nature eBook Printed edition: 9783031749506 Printed edition: 9783031749520 Printed edition: 9783031749537 Contributions to Economics, 2197-7178 70785 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3 ZDB-2-ECF ZDB-2-SXEF 66137 66137