03614nam a22004695i 4500001001800000003000900018005001700027007001500044008004100059020001800100024003500118050001400153072001600167072002300183072001500206100007300221245011900294250001800413264007200431300006600503336002600569337002600595338003600621347002400657490003700681505055900718520147301277650001802750650002102768650001902789650002002808650001802828650002702846650002002873710003402893773002602927776003602953776003602989776003603025830003703061856004603098978-981-97-9594-9DE-He21320251030114919.0cr nn 008mamaa250103s2024    si |    s    |||| 0|eng d  a97898197959497 a10.1007/978-981-97-9594-92doi 4aHT101-395 7aJPR2bicssc 7aPOL0020002bisacsh 7aJPR2thema1 aLi, Xuewen.eauthor.4aut4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut10aLand Developmentalism: Local Governments and Land Overdevelopment in Chinah[electronic resource] /cby Xuewen Li.  a1st ed. 2024. 1aSingapore :bSpringer Nature Singapore :bImprint: Springer,c2024.  aXVIII, 209 p. 26 illus., 9 illus. in color.bonline resource.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  atext filebPDF2rda1 aUrban Sustainability,x2731-64910 aLand Overdevelopment by Local Governments under Strict Control of Construction Land Quotas -- The Logic of Land Overdevelopment by Local Governments -- The Inevitability of Overdevelopment of Land by Local Governments: A Simple Game Analysis -- Imitative Competition: Illegal Land Use by Local Governments -- Institutional Collusion: Land Development Rights Trading -- Land Overdevelopment and Local Economic Growth -- Land Overdevelopment and Protection of Arable land -- Governance of Local Governments’ Land Overdevelopment - An Extended Discussion.  aThis book examines the strategies adopted by local governments to obtain excess construction land quotas in the face of the central government’s strict land management system. It applies game theory, principal-agent theory, collective action theory, and competition and collusion theory to analyze the trade-offs and constraints faced by local governments under the existing institutional framework. It also empirically tests the imitative competitive strategy of land violation and the institutional collusion strategy of land development rights trading using spatial panel model and Tobit model. The book reveals the internal mechanism behind local governments’ simultaneous adoption of competitive and collusive strategies in pursuing local interests and economic growth. It also shows how local governments’ land violations have significant strategic characteristics in time and space, and how economic development gap, resource endowment gap, and human network relationship influence their collusion formation in land development rights trading. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on land management, local governance, and political economy in China. It is suitable for scholars, students, policy makers, and practitioners who are interested in understanding the complex dynamics of land development in China. The book is written in an accessible and engaging style, with clear explanations of theoretical concepts and empirical methods. 0aUrban policy. 0aEconomic policy. 0aSocial policy. 0aSustainability.14aUrban Policy.24aSocio-Economic Policy.24aSustainability.2 aSpringerLink (Online service)0 tSpringer Nature eBook08iPrinted edition:z978981979593208iPrinted edition:z978981979595608iPrinted edition:z9789819795963 0aUrban Sustainability,x2731-649140uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9594-9