Insider Threats / Matthew Bunn, Scott D. Sagan.

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Material type: Text

TextLanguage: English Series: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2017]Copyright date: ©2017Description: 1 online resource : 1 halftone, 3 tables, 6 chartsContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781501705946

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

HV6432

Online resources:

Contents:

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Inside the Insider Threat -- 1. Insiders and Outsiders: A Survey of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Facilities / Hegghammer, Thomas / Dæhli, Andreas Hoelstad -- 2. The Fort Hood Terrorist Attack: An Organizational Postmortem of Army and FBI Deficiencies / Zegart, Amy B. -- 3. Lessons from the Anthrax Letters / Stern, Jessica / Schouten, Ronald -- 4. Green-on-Blue Violence: A First Look at Lessons from the Insider Threat in Afghanistan / Long, Austin -- 5. Preventing Insider Theft: Lessons from the Casino and Pharmaceutical Industries / Bunn, Matthew / Glynn, Kathryn M. -- 6. A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats / Bunn, Matthew / Sagan, Scott D. -- Index

Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook Package 2011-2017Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016Title is part of eBook package: Cornell Univ. Press eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016-2017Summary: High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders-trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.ContributorsMatthew Bunn, Harvard UniversityAndreas Hoelstad Dæhli, OsloKathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, OsloAustin Long, Columbia UniversityScott D. Sagan, Stanford UniversityRonald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School Jessica Stern, Harvard UniversityAmy B. Zegart, Stanford University

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High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders-trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.ContributorsMatthew Bunn, Harvard UniversityAndreas Hoelstad Dæhli, OsloKathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, OsloAustin Long, Columbia UniversityScott D. Sagan, Stanford UniversityRonald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School Jessica Stern, Harvard UniversityAmy B. Zegart, Stanford University

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)

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