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The Statebuilder's Dilemma : On the Limits of Foreign Intervention / David A. Lake.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2016]Copyright date: ©2016Description: 1 online resource : 4 line figures, 2 chartsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781501703836
Subject(s):
LOC classification:
  • JZ6300 .L355 2016eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Building Legitimate States -- 2. Problems of Sovereignty -- 3. Legitimacy and Loyalty -- 4. Statebuilding in Iraq -- 5. Statebuilding in Somalia -- Conclusion -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index
Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook-Package 2016Title is part of eBook package: COR eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016Title is part of eBook package: Cornell Univ. Press eBook-Package Pilot Project 2016-2017Summary: The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader's legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Building Legitimate States -- 2. Problems of Sovereignty -- 3. Legitimacy and Loyalty -- 4. Statebuilding in Iraq -- 5. Statebuilding in Somalia -- Conclusion -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index

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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader's legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)

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