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020 _a9783031529399
_9978-3-031-52939-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-52939-9
_2doi
050 4 _aK201-487
072 7 _aLAB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI000000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aLAB
_2thema
100 1 _aSegatti, Marco.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_972250
245 1 0 _aEqual Access to Justice
_h[electronic resource] :
_bOn the Duty to Pause, Cool Down, and Listen /
_cby Marco Segatti.
250 _a1st ed. 2024.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2024.
300 _aXII, 191 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLaw and Philosophy Library,
_x2215-0315 ;
_v145
505 0 _a1 Introduction -- Part I. Domain: conceptual, empirical and historical explorations of access to justice -- 2 Is there a (Human) Right of Access to Justice? -- 3 Equal access to justice: Three interpretations -- 4 Duties of assistance and the criminal/civil distinction -- 5 Unmet legal needs: identification and rich descriptions -- Part II Normative foundations -- 6 The need for a theoretical base: four arguments -- 7 Why capabilities? On the duty to, at times and provisionally, pause, cool down, and listen -- 8 The instrumentalities of access to justice in defending democratic cooperation -- Part III. Practical applications. Testing the political principles of equal access to justice -- 9 Free legal counsel and access to justice -- 10 Is group litigation legitimate? -- 11 Still Against Settlement? -- 12 Conclusion.
520 _aIt is wrong when someone cannot exercise their rights in a court of law because they have no money to pay for a good lawyer, because they are too scared of the possible consequences, or because they simply don’t know that the law protects them. But does that mean governments have an obligation to intervene? And if so, how? This book provides the first systematic philosophical theory of equal access to justice. It begins by identifying the content of claims to equal access to justice. Then, it reviews traditional political and legal arguments on the right of access to justice, which it argues are both illuminating and insufficient. The best comparative way to approach equal access to justice, the book argues, is to think through the requirements of a moral, pre-political, duty to – at times and provisionally – pause, cool down and listen: in other words, we ought to demand that governments step in and protect access rights, because we have a moral and pre-political interest in cultivating our ability to comply with this duty. It is the recognition of this duty which best explains both law’s potential for promoting, as well as its potential for endangering, equal justice. In closing, the book tests this novel theory of equal access to justice against contemporary trends and reforms in procedural law. .
650 0 _aLaw
_xPhilosophy.
_967596
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy of Law.
_972251
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031529382
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031529405
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031529412
830 0 _aLaw and Philosophy Library,
_x2215-0315 ;
_v145
_972252
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52939-9
912 _aZDB-2-LCR
912 _aZDB-2-SXLC
999 _c58045
_d58045