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020 _a9783031526251
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024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-52625-1
_2doi
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_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI013000
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_2thema
100 1 _aAzzano, Lorenzo.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_972349
245 1 0 _aDispositional Reality
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Novel Approach to Power Ontology and Metaphysics /
_cby Lorenzo Azzano.
250 _a1st ed. 2024.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2024.
300 _aXI, 246 p. 1 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,
_x2542-8292 ;
_v482
505 0 _a1. Introduction -- 2. Reality -- 3. Appearance -- 4. Dispositional Reality -- 5. In favour of Dispositional Reality -- 6. The extent of Dispositional Reality -- 7. Explaining with dispositions -- 8. Meta-explanatory questions -- 9. The future of Dispositional Reality.
520 _aDispositionalism, perhaps the most popular variant of non-Humean metaphysics, submits that dispositions, powers, or capacities, are part of the furniture of the world. In this book I advance an original approach to dispositionalism revolving around the notion of Dispositional Reality; the novelty lies in the fact that the account, unlike most alternatives on the market, does not require the reification of objects, facts, properties, nor their dispositional essences – and is in fact compatible with a far more deflationary approach to dispositions, while still being true to the non-Humean spirit of the proposal. This power metaphysics without powers allows one to dispel several puzzles in recent literature, or recast them under a new light. Albeit with its own peculiarities, this proposal constitutes a variant of explanatory dispositionalism, according to which realism about dispositions ought not to be understood as an ontological inflation, but as an explanatory inversion within the nomic and modal family. Some of these explanations are hereby attempted, and a study of various types of non-causal explanation will be provided.
650 0 _aMetaphysics.
_970839
650 0 _aOntology.
_960617
650 0 _aScience
_xPhilosophy.
_963307
650 1 4 _aMetaphysics.
_970839
650 2 4 _aOntology.
_960617
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
_968560
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031526244
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031526268
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031526275
830 0 _aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,
_x2542-8292 ;
_v482
_972350
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52625-1
912 _aZDB-2-REP
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