000 04925nam a22005295i 4500
001 978-3-031-49715-5
003 DE-He213
005 20251030111808.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 240408s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783031497155
_9978-3-031-49715-5
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5
_2doi
050 4 _aBD143-237
072 7 _aHPK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI004000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aQDTK
_2thema
100 1 _aMcGee, Andrew.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_974845
245 1 0 _aIntuitively Rational: How We Think and How We Should
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Andrew McGee, Charles Foster.
250 _a1st ed. 2024.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer Nature Switzerland :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2024.
300 _aXIII, 215 p. 5 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _aChapter 1. Introduction: the Agony of Corinne Rey -- Chapter 2. Beginnings -- Chapter 3. Neuroscience and judgement -- Chapter 4. Taking the evolutionary psychological elephant by the tusks -- Chapter 5. Moral truth -- Chapter 6. Can our moral beliefs be debunked? -- Chapter 7. Selfish genes and morality -- Chapter 8. Joshua Greene’s empirical challenge to deontology -- Chapter 9. Limits of trolley-problem-style thought experiments -- Chapter 10. Realistic trolleyology? -- Chapter 11. Steering a course between intuitionism and austere rationalism -- Chapter 12. Conclusion.
520 _aThis book is about the respective roles of intuition and reasoning in ethics. It responds to a number of well-known philosophers and psychologists, and proposes a new perspective – radical in its moderation. It examines in depth the work of the philosopher Joshua Greene and the psychologist Jonathan Haidt. With the so-called empirical turn in ethics, much work has been done to try to isolate the role of reason and intuition in forming our moral judgements, with Haidt and Greene leading the research programmes and attracting much of the professional and public attention, and many others following. The current view – shared by both camps – is that intuition is largely the driver of our moral judgements – a view summed up in Haidt’s slogan ‘intuition first, strategic reasoning second’. Haidt believes we have to live with this and accept it. Greene does not: he contends that our intuitions, while suitable for the environments in which we evolved, are worthless in the modern, global, technological age, and to avoid ethical disaster we must learn to adopt reason as the arbiter of moral truth. This book steers a middle course between these two positions and is therefore of great interest to philosophers and psychologists alike. Intuition and reason, and different conceptions of them, lie behind many significant discussions in recent philosophical ethics and moral psychology. One effect of those discussions has been the insertion of a wedge between the two notions. In this engaging and fascinating book, McGee and Foster make a thought-provoking case for removing that wedge. Professor Roger Crisp, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford I wanted to cheer all the way through this beautifully written book – one that is both incisive and profoundly humane. So much moral philosophy is ensnared in simple rationalism or simple intuitionism: this book argues that intuition and reason are not just at times compatible, in a sort of uneasy compromise, but that each is always essential to the proper functioning of the other. Its takedown of so much utilitarianism is long overdue. It embraces what can be learnt from neuroscience and at the same time appeals to morality in the practice of life, not just in the seminar room. A book that should be on every intelligent reader’s shelves. Dr Iain McGilchrist, author of The Master and His Emissary and The Matter with Things.
650 0 _aKnowledge, Theory of.
_959222
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aEthics.
_958934
650 1 4 _aEpistemology.
_969783
650 2 4 _aMoral Psychology.
_974846
650 2 4 _aMoral Philosophy and Applied Ethics.
_966410
700 1 _aFoster, Charles.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_974847
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031497148
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031497162
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031497179
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49715-5
912 _aZDB-2-BSP
912 _aZDB-2-SXBP
999 _c58998
_d58998