| 000 | 05046nam a22005175i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 978-3-031-51936-9 | ||
| 003 | DE-He213 | ||
| 005 | 20251030112000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
| 008 | 240418s2024 sz | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9783031519369 _9978-3-031-51936-9 |
||
| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-031-51936-9 _2doi |
|
| 050 | 4 | _aK201-487 | |
| 050 | 4 | _aK140-165 | |
| 072 | 7 |
_aLAB _2bicssc |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aLAW000000 _2bisacsh |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aLAB _2thema |
|
| 100 | 1 |
_aSiliquini-Cinelli, Luca. _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _975409 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aScientia Iuris _h[electronic resource] : _bKnowledge and Experience in Legal Education and Practice from the Late Roman Republic to Artificial Intelligence / _cby Luca Siliquini-Cinelli. |
| 250 | _a1st ed. 2024. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_aCham : _bSpringer Nature Switzerland : _bImprint: Springer, _c2024. |
|
| 300 |
_aXVI, 382 p. _bonline resource. |
||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
||
| 490 | 1 |
_aIus Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, _x2214-9902 ; _v112 |
|
| 505 | 0 | _aChapter One – Introduction -- Chapter Two – Knowledge vs Experience -- Chapter Three – The Late Roman Republic: The Inception of Metaphysical Abstractness -- Chapter Four – The Middle Ages: The Systematic Renovation of Scientia Iuris -- Chapter Five – Methodological Legal Positivism -- Chapter six – The Common Law Tradition -- Chapter Seven – Conclusion. | |
| 520 | _aLaw’s regulatory reach has grown significantly over the past few decades. Yet, at the same time, law schools and legal professions in Western and Western-oriented jurisdictions have undergone an acute crisis. How is this possible? In this insightful and wide-ranging book, Luca Siliquini-Cinelli argues that these trends are in fact complementary manifestations of a single phenomenon—namely, that law is and will always be more capable of regulating social interaction without the experiential contribution of legal experts. Siliquini-Cinelli contends that the separation of law’s regulatory function from legal experts is structurally linked to the former’s nature and operational dynamics as an intellectual artifact to be used for ordering purposes. As a product of the intellect, law is a matter of knowledge, not experience. In fact, Siliquini-Cinelli holds, law’s artifactuality voids experience, including that of legal experts, making it redundant. This explains how law can thrive as a regulatory phenomenon while the very places where future legal professionals are formed and those places where it is practised are in crisis. To show this, Siliquini-Cinelli embarks upon a historical, philosophical, and comparative analysis of law’s artifactuality, focusing on the teaching, study and practise of law as intellectual endeavours, from the advent of juristic activities in the Late Roman Republic to current legal pedagogies, practices, and reforms in Civil and Common law jurisdictions. In so doing, Siliquini-Cinelli employs the Latin phrase ‘scientia iuris’ to explain why and how legal education and practice pursue knowledge at the expense of experience, and the serious implications this has for lawyering activities. Moving beyond established narratives, Siliquini-Cinelli argues that ‘scientia iuris’ ought not be reduced to dogmatic analysis (scientia iuris as doctrina iuris). Rather, ‘scientia iuris’ denotes the knowledge of the law sought by all those who teach, study, and practise it, and which is actualised through a form of legal thinking and argumentation that moves along reason’s metaphysical, constructivist lines (scientia iuris as cognitio iuris). Thus, scientia iuris is not the prerogative of a few legal scholars; rather, it lies at the very core of Western legal education and practice, broadly understood. The relevance of Siliquini-Cinelli’s original and interdisciplinary analysis is profound and far-reaching: the crisis that legal education and practice are undergoing is not an isolated, or accidental, event; it is a consequence of the very ways in which law has been taught, studied, and practised since Rome. . | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aLaw _xPhilosophy. _967596 |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_aLaw _xHistory. _967597 |
|
| 650 | 1 | 4 |
_aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History. _967600 |
| 710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
| 773 | 0 | _tSpringer Nature eBook | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783031519352 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783031519376 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783031519383 |
| 830 | 0 |
_aIus Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, _x2214-9902 ; _v112 _914932 |
|
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51936-9 |
| 912 | _aZDB-2-LCR | ||
| 912 | _aZDB-2-SXLC | ||
| 999 |
_c59227 _d59227 |
||