| 000 | 03060nam a22005295i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 978-981-97-3056-8 | ||
| 003 | DE-He213 | ||
| 005 | 20251030112612.0 | ||
| 007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
| 008 | 240703s2024 si | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9789819730568 _9978-981-97-3056-8 |
||
| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-981-97-3056-8 _2doi |
|
| 050 | 4 | _aHB846.8 | |
| 072 | 7 |
_aKCP _2bicssc |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aPOL023000 _2bisacsh |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aKCP _2thema |
|
| 100 | 1 |
_aTorii, Akio. _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _980011 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aDecision-making in High-Risk Projects _h[electronic resource] / _cby Akio Torii. |
| 250 | _a1st ed. 2024. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_aSingapore : _bSpringer Nature Singapore : _bImprint: Springer, _c2024. |
|
| 300 |
_aXI, 108 p. 11 illus. _bonline resource. |
||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
||
| 505 | 0 | _a Introduction -- Decision making problems in risky projects -- Literature Review -- Model Construction -- Incentive to Acquire a Precursor -- Incentive to Continue the Research Trial -- Confidentiality of Observed Precursor -- Conclusion. | |
| 520 | _aThis book identifies and systematically confirms the various factors that allow dangerous nuclear power projects to proceed without adequate risk assessment, even as society recognizes the magnitude of risks associated with nuclear power generation. For the first time, it employs a communication game model to explore each factor individually. The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power. | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aEconomics. _958354 |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_aSocial choice. _970816 |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_aIndustrial policy. _969808 |
|
| 650 | 0 | _aGame theory. | |
| 650 | 1 | 4 |
_aPublic Choice and Political Economy. _970817 |
| 650 | 2 | 4 |
_aRegulation and Industrial Policy. _969809 |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aGame Theory. |
| 710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
| 773 | 0 | _tSpringer Nature eBook | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9789819730551 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9789819730575 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9789819730582 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-3056-8 |
| 912 | _aZDB-2-ECF | ||
| 912 | _aZDB-2-SXEF | ||
| 999 |
_c61330 _d61330 |
||