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020 _a9783031608032
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024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-60803-2
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_2bicssc
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100 1 _aHuber, Ludwig.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_980288
245 1 4 _aThe Rational Animal
_h[electronic resource] :
_bIn Search of Complex Cognition in Non-Human Animals /
_cby Ludwig Huber.
250 _a1st ed. 2024.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer Nature Switzerland :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2024.
300 _aXVI, 366 p. 28 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
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505 0 _a1. Historical Outline of the Basic Questions of Animal Cognition -- 2. Can Animals be Rational? -- 3. Tool use -- 4. Causal Understanding -- 5. Looking into the Future -- 6. Episodic Memory -- 7. Metacognition -- 8. Mind Reading -- 9. Do Animals Have Language? -- 10. Do Animals Have Consciousness? -- 11. How Do Animals Think? A Seven-point Summary -- . Epiligue -- . References -- .
520 _aIn this book, the major and at the same time most difficult questions of comparative cognition research - here called the sextet of animal intelligence - are presented using good examples, discussed in all their facets and finally answered with due caution. Starting with the question of human rationality, which is illuminated historically at the beginning and presented as a framework concept, the latest research is dealt with, which either revises preferred interpretation schemes or calls for new ones. It is particularly important to critically question hastily conceived categorisations, often derived from research on the human species and from everyday psychological notions, and to consider so-called animal irrationality, a.k.a. (mis)performance, from the perspective of species-specific, natural requirements. Why is it at all important to know whether animals can act rationally, intentionally or consciously? The answer is because it is of both theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretical relevance is twofold: because it is good in itself to understand animals better, but this knowledge is then also of great importance for assessing ourselves. This brings up the practical relevance: we are not only surrounded by animals, we live with animals, we live from animals. Yet we see ourselves as separate from them in important ways. Consciousness, language and rationality are essential characteristics with which we justify our human uniqueness and thus our superiority and ultimately our right to dominate and use animals in many ways. If an animal can feel pain, we feel obliged to avoid inflicting unnecessary pain on it. But yet we do not accord it the special inherent value and dignity associated with consciousness and rationality. This has far-reaching consequences for human action and the coexistence of humans and animals.
650 0 _aPsychology.
_963758
650 0 _aPsychology, Comparative.
_980289
650 0 _aCognition in animals.
_976906
650 1 4 _aBehavioral Sciences and Psychology.
_968075
650 2 4 _aComparative Psychology.
_980290
650 2 4 _aAnimal Cognition.
_976907
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031608025
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031608049
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031608056
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60803-2
912 _aZDB-2-BSP
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999 _c61476
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